been of a vacant for a term of 12 years but at the expiry of the term, the tenant had put up a building on the land; the tenant paid rent monthly at the end of the 12 years and he thus invoked the protection of the statutory provision requiring that the tenancy be terminated with a month‟s notice. The landlord argued that since the letting was of vacant land, the tenant could not invoke the protection of the statute. It was held that since the landlord was aware of building having being erected on the land and even after the 12-year term was up, continued to accept rent, thereby accepting the position that a monthly tenancy existed, the nature of which was acknowledged to be a tenancy of a dwelling house, the premises being described in the landlord‟s notice before action and in the application for summons not as land but as rooms, the tenant was entitled to the protection of the statute. It does happen that the premises let are residential but the tenant changes the user to a nonresidential purpose or vice versa. The authorities are one in holding that where the landlord acquiesced in the change of user, the law applicable is the statute in the changed state of the premises. In Macarthy v. Lemonu (1966) 2 All NLR 44, the premises in dispute was let as vacant land but at the time the landlord brought this action to recover possession, the tenant had erected a building on it. The statutory notice described the premises as vacant land and the issue for determination was whether the premises should have been described as it was when the notices were served, (viz, as a house). It was held that if the landlord acquiesced to a change of user, the notices were defective.