predominate. In Nasr v. Bouari (1969) All NLR 35, the Supreme Court per Lewis JSC held that even where premises were used partly for living or sleeping and partly as a shop, it was not necessary to show that the living or sleeping was the predominant use. Any use by living would be covered by the definition. The statute that came up for construction in the case is the Rent Control (Lagos) Amendment Act 1965, section 4 of which provides in part: “Premises for the purpose of this section means a building of any description occupied or used by persons for living or sleeping or other lawful purposes, as the case may be, whether or not at any time it is also occupied or used under any tenancy as a shop or store.” The apartment in issue was used partly as a nightclub and partly for sleeping and the issue was whether the use that was more substantial should predominate. The court held that such consideration was unnecessary and did not arise. Not infrequently, premises may be let for one purpose and in the course of time, the tenant uses it for another purpose. At the time of service of notice to quit, the issue may be whether the premises are residential or non-residential. The question is what is the nature of the premises? First, the premises is considered or viewed as it was when it was let. Secondly, the onus is on the tenant to convince the court that the landlord knew of the change of user and he acquiesced. In which case, the premises would be as they are at the time of notice to quit. In Kasunmu v. Ibironke (1952) 14 WACA 189, the plaintiff gave the defendant notice of his intention to apply to court to recover possession, describing the holding as rooms, and in the writ of summons the claim was for possession of the room occupied by the defendant. The letting had