one in that it is contrary to the truth; it is wholly founded on the assumption that purchaser does not know the facts; and yet it is said that constructively he does know them. Therefore, the doctrine ought not to be extended further, otherwise, it may defeat the end of justice which the judges who invented it wanted to serve. In Bailey v. Barnes (1894) 1 Ch. 25 at 35, Lindley L.J. gave expression to the judicial attitude limiting the application of the doctrine. He said, with reference to section 3 of the Conveyancing Act 1882. 'The Conveyancing Act, 1882, really does no more than state the law as it was before, but its negative form shows that a restriction rather than extension of the doctrine of notice was intended by the Legislature.' The section is construed not to import a duty or obligation; for a purchaser need not make inquiry. The standard of diligence required of a purchaser is not a very high one, however, his conduct in the transaction must not fall below that of a reasonable man, having regard to what is usually done by me~ of business under similar circumstances. See further Taylor v. London and County Banking Company (1901) 2 Ch. 231, at 258-259. (iii) Imputed Notice: This is a kind of notice which is neither actual nor constructive to the purchaser, but which is imputed to him through the actual or constructive know- ledge of his agent is a settled principle that notice to an agent is notice to the principal. If we held otherwise it would cause great inconveniences, and no- tice would be avoided in every case by employing agents. See Sheldon v. Cox (1764) 2 Eden 224. Notice will be imputed to a purchaser only through his bonafide agent. See Orasanmi v. Idowu (1959) 4 F.S.C. 40 at 42. A purchaser who instructed his