notice of any instrument or matter or any fact or thing unless it is within his own knowledge, or would have come to his knowledge if such inquiries and inspections had been made as ought reasonably to have been made by him. The general view of the provision seems to be that the doctrine of notice ought, not to be extended. In English and Scottish Mercantile Investment Company v. Brunton (1892) 2 Q.B. 700 at 707-708, Lord Esher M.R said: “when a man has statements made to him, or has knowledge of facts, which do not expressly tell him of something which is against him, and he abstains from making further inquiry because he knows the result would be- or, as the phrase is, he "wilfully shuts his eyes" - then judges are in the habit of telling juries that they may infer that he did know what was against him. It is an inference of fact drawn because you cannot look into a man's mind, but you can infer from his conduct whether he is speaking truly or not when he says that he did not know of particular facts. There is no question of constructive notice or constructive knowledge involved which is inferred. Constructive notice or knowledge, as I have said, is an equitable doctrine wholly; it is a doctrine not known to the common law, but it must now be dealt with and acknowledged by the courts which administer the common law It is, therefore necessary for us to see how far the doctrine extends and is to be carried out, and to consider its nature and limits as laid down by the judges who invented and have ap- plied it. Of late years, after the doctrine had been invented and put into form, the Chancery judges saw that it was being carried must farther than had been intended, and they declined to carry it further.” No doubt, the doctrine of constructive notice is a dangerous