behind the acquisition of the property and that purpose subsists, the court may not order a sale but may instead order one party – likely the party that has majority interest in the property – to pay off the other and retain the property. There are two lines of cases on this point. One is a group of cases outside matrimony where parties come together to acquire interest in land and when the partnership gets sour, the issue turns on whether the collateral (secondary) purpose for acquiring the land subsists or not. If it subsists, the court is reluctant to make an order of sale; rather, it may order that the party who seeks a sale is paid off while the other(s) keep the property and ensure that the collateral purpose is not defeated. See Re Buchanan-Wallaston’s Conveyance [1939] Ch. 378. In contrast, where the collateral purpose is matrimony, the court would usually not order a sale so long the marriage subsists. A sale while the marriage subsists would mean an implied dissolution of the marriage; something the court is reluctant to achieve. See Jones v. Challenger (1961) 1 Q.B. 176. In Mesher v. Mesher (1980) 1 All E.R 126, upon the dissolution of marriage, the court ordered a sale but postponed same until after the children had attain a majority. In effect, the house was held on trust for sale but the sale postponed until the youngest child attained the age of 17. In Re Holliday (1980) 3 All E.R. 385 at 394, Goff LJ stated that the test “in the exercise of the court‟s discretion is not whether the wife is being reasonable, but in all the circumstances of the case, whose voice in equity ought to prevail.” So instead of sticking to the collateral purpose test, a general discretion is available. In exercising this discretion, regard can be had to such matters