that a married woman, on the death of her husband without a male issue, with the concurrence of her husband’s family, may deal with his (deceased’s) property; her dealing of course, must receive the consent of the family. The consent…may be actual or implied from the circumstances of the case, but she cannot assume ownership of the property or alienate it. She cannot, by effluxion of time, claim the property as her own. If the family does not give their consent, she cannot…deal with the property. She has however, a right to occupy the building or part of it, but this is subject to good behavior. One of the requirements for the principle of limitation of action to apply is that the squatter’s possession must be adverse. In the present case, it is clear that the possession of the widow cannot be regarded as adverse. She occupied the land by virtue of her relationship (as a wife) to the family of the respondents, and her possession can never be adverse to the right of her husband’s family and she cannot, however long she was in possession of the land, acquire an absolute right to possession of it as against her husband’s family.” In Akinkunmi v. Sadiq [2001] 2 NWLR (Pt. 696) 101, the two parties were beneficiaries under a will. The defendant disputed the validity of the will and this occupied the parties in an action that lasted from 1974 to 1995; all the while the defendant was in possession of the property. The will was eventually declared valid. In this action, the plaintiff sued to recover possession of the portion of the house devised to him. In response, the defendant applied for the action to be struck out on the ground that it was statute barred; counting from 1973 when the testatrix died. The Court of Appeal held that time started to count from 1995 as the