let into possession. The property was redeemed in 1973 but the mortgagee refused to vacate possession. In 1986, this action was commenced to recover the property. The Court of Appeal held that the action was statute barred by one „offending‟ year. Tobi JCA stated succinctly: “It is a matter of calculation of raw figures in the determination of whether an accused is statute barred or not. A court of law has no discretion in the matter. Once the period set down in the statute is not complied with, the action must be thrown out, even if the excess is only a day… since it is not the function of the court to rewrite the law, it has to do its only function of enforcing the law by declaring an action statute barred in appropriate circumstances.” Another important point to note under this statute is that the squatter‟s interest is not adversely affected because the land owner is ignorant of the squatting. Time begins to count from the date the squatter enters the land and not the date the original owner claims he became aware of the squatter‟s presence on the land. In Ajibona v. Kolawale [1996] 10 NWLR (Pt. 476) 22 C.A, the plaintiff sued for declaration of title to land. In response, the defendant showed that he had been in unbroken possession of the land for 17 years before the action was commenced. He pleaded the Limitation Law as defence. The plaintiff was unable to prove his title; all the same, the Supreme Court discussed the place of the landowner‟s knowledge as a ground to defeat the operation of the Limitation Law. The court adopted the following dissenting view of Ayoola JCA: “Where the user by the defendant of the land is equivocal the question whether it is sufficient to amount to a dispossession of the plaintiff depends neither on the knowledge of the plaintiff