whether an act was accidental or intentional, or done with a particular knowledge or intention or to rebut any defence that may otherwise be open to the defendant, the fact that such act formed part of a series of similar occurrences, in each of which the person doing the act was concerned, is relevant. The material content of the above provision has a very close resemblance to the Common Law principle on Similar Evidence as given by Lord Herschel. This position stipulates that similar fact evidence will only be admissible if it is relevant to the issue whether the acts alleged to constitute the offence charged were designed or accidental. Take note that notwithstanding the admissibility of similar fact evidence under section 12 of the Evidence Act 2011, this provision is not applicable automatically, as the Court has power to exclude or jettison such evidence if it is considered evidence prejudicial to the fair trial of the accused. The provisions of Section 12 of the Evidence Act 2011 has been subjected to several argument as regards its concept implication which is believed to be devoid of the real principle contained in the MAKIN’s case which allows the evidence of similar facts ‘’to rebut a defence which would otherwise be open to an accused person’’. It has been confirmed in response to the argument that there are no reported authorities t o the contrary in Nigeria. It has also been asserted that notwithstanding the fact that Section 12 of the Evidence Act 2011 is devoid of the direct provision of the common law rule which allows the evidence of similar facts ‘’to rebut a defence which would otherwise be open to an accused person’’, such provisions can be read into when considered along with the provision of Section 5 of the Evidence Act 1990