cannot affect, through the doctrine of imputed notice, his principal in a subsequent transaction. Section 136 subsection 1 (ii) of the Conveyancing Act, 1882, (a statute of general application) now provides that a purchaser shall not be prejudicially affected by notice of any instrument, fact or thing unless in the same transaction with respect to which a question of notice to the purchaser arises that it has come to the knowledge of his solicitor or other agent, as such, or would yet come to the knowledge of his solicitor or other agent, as such, if such inquiries and inspections been made as ought reasonably to have been made by the solicitor or other agent. See similar provision in section 194. (1)(ii)(b) of the Property and Conveyancing Law (W.N.) 1959. This section has been judicially construed in ln re Cousins (1886) 31 Ch.D.671 at 677. In the course of his judgment, Chitty J. said: “There must be something which comes to the knowledge of the solicitor as such and in the transactions. The words ‘come to the knowledge’ are not unimportant and seem to me to afford the answer to the argument that Banks had knowledge because he formerly knew. The section says "come to the knowledge" and I cannot impute to him that the knowledge had come to him in this transaction because he knew it on the former occasion. To do that would destroy the section. Every word of it requires careful weighing and the result is (1) that it must be in the same transaction, (2) the matter must come to the knowledge, and (3) must come to the knowledge of his Solicitor as such viz, as solicitor of the mortgagee.” In Okunubi v. Assaf (1951) 13 WACA 226 at 231, the West African Court of Appeal held that notice that comes to the knowledge of a solicitor in a previous transaction cannot be imputed