The function of notice is not to create a property right, it is to prevent the holder of a superior title from using such title for a purpose that is inconsistent with good faith and honest dealings. See Re Nisbet and Potts' Contract (1905) 1 Ch. 391; Barker v. Stickney (1919) 1 K.B. 121. The importance of notice therefore is that it enables a court of equity to bind the conscience of a purchaser of a supe- rior title and forbid him to set up his superior title against prior owners of inferior interest affecting the property. (Lord Westbury L.C. in Buckland v. Gibbins (1863) 32 L.J. Ch. 391, 395). It is clear therefore that a purchaser of legal estate with notice of prior equitable interest affecting property takes subject to the prior equitable interest. See Assaf v. Oyinloye (1951) 20 N.L.R. 1. Basis of the Doctrine The doctrine of notice is relatively free from artificiality or technicality. Questions and problems arising from the doctrine have always been decided with reference to simple common sense, justice and fairplay. As Rhodes J., observed: 'The rules in respect to notice to purchasers of adverse titles or claims, other than such as is imparted by the records, are not founded upon any arbitrary provisions of law, but have their origin in the considerations of prudence and honesty which guide men in their ordinary business transactions.' See Lawton v. Gordon (18699) 37 Cat. 202, 206. Indeed, it is very much true to say that the doctrine of notice is one of many cases in which equity has placed high premium on substance and in which, in the accomplishment of its ultimate purpose to do justice, brushes aside all matters of form or technically except when controlled by statutory requirements. (Lord Cranworth in Ware v. Egmont (1854) 4 De. G: M. & G. 460).