The doctrine of bonafide purchaser for value without notice provides the most fundamental dis- tinction between legal and equitable rights in property. The doctrine is equally important in the determination of priority between rival claimants of interests in property. The essence of the doc- trine is that where a defendant has a better equity or a superior title, a court of equity will not de- prive such defendant of any right of property, whether legal or equitable, for which he has given value without notice of the plaintiff's equity. See the following cases, Ajose v. Harworth (1925) 6 N.L.R. 98; Griffin v. Talabi (1948) 12 W.A.C.A. 370; Martins v. Molade (1930) 9 N.L.R. 53. The plea of purchaser for value without notice becomes relevant where there is competition be- tween (i) legal and equitable interests, (ii) two equitable interests, and (iii) equitable interest and mere equity. Bona Fide Purchaser of the Legal Estate for Value Without Notice Much ‘as Courts of Equity break in upon the common law, when necessity and conscience re- quire it, still they allow superior force and strength to a legal title to estates.’ Per Lord Herd- wicke L.C. in Wortley v. Birkhead (1754) 2 Ves. Sen. 571 at 574. See further, L. & S.W. Rail- ways v. Gomm (1882) 20 Ch.D. 562, 586. Once the plea of bona fide purchaser of the legal es- tate for value without notice is sustained by the court, any other incumbrancers' claims or inter- ests will be postponed. Both the test and the strength of the plea are illustrated by the decision of James L.J. in Pilcher v. Rawlins (1872) 7 Ch. App. 259 at 268. “I propose simply to apply myself to the case of a purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice, obtaining, upon the occasion of his purchase,